Prospect theory around the world by Rieger, Marc Oliver et al.
Discussion paper
FOR 19  2011
ISSN:  1500-4066
October  2011
INSTITUTT FOR FORETAKSØKONOMI
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
Prospect Theory around 
the World
BY
Marc Oliver Rieger, Mei Wang, 
AND Thorsten Hens
Prospect Theory around the World
Marc Oliver Rieger∗
Mei Wang†
Thorsten Hens‡
August 29, 2011
Abstract
We present results from the first large-scale international survey
on risk preferences, conducted in 45 countries. We show substantial
cross-country differences in risk aversion, loss aversion and probability
weighting. Moreover, risk attitudes in our sample depend not only on
economic conditions, but also on cultural factors, as measured by the
Hofstede dimensions Individuality and Uncertainty Avoidance. The
presented data might also serve as an interesting starting point for
further research in cultural economics.
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1 Introduction
Risk preferences are a key determinant of economic behavior. They deter-
mine for example the degree of insurance households buy, are decisive for
their assets allocation decisions, and are a key determinant of firms’ cost
of capital. Research on risk preferences has therefore been at the center of
economics in general and of finance in particular.
The purpose of our study is to analyze whether there are international
differences between risk preferences and if so whether they correlate with
economic or cultural factors. Those differences are certainly important for
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institutions offering insurance and investment products in multiple countries
and they might also help to explain international differences in the cost of
capital.
Previous studies have shown that there is a substantial amount of vari-
ation between subjects from different countries on risk perception, risk at-
titudes and probabilistic thinking. In particular, it is found that coun-
tries with collectivistic cultural traditions tend to perceive less financial
risks and appear to be less risk-averse (e.g.,Bontempo, Bottom & Weber
(1997), Hsee & Weber (1999) and Wang & Fischbeck (2008)). The “cush-
ion” hypothesis is proposed to explain such phenomena: the strong so-
cial network in the collectivistic society provides a certain kind of “cush-
ion” against the potential financial catastrophe, and therefore induce more
risk-seeking behavior. Researchers also find East-Asian subjects tend to
be more overconfident in probability judgement (Yates, Zhu, Ronis, Wang,
Shinotsuka & Toda 1989, Yates, Lee, Shinotsuka, Patalano & Sieck 1998,
Wang & Fischbeck 2008), which can be contributed to early education style
(Bontempo et al. 1997, Hsee & Weber 1999, Renn & Rohrmann 2000).
The research question of our study is whether the variation between
countries is systematic and can be explained by macroeconomic or cultural
factors. We find substantial cross-country differences in risk aversion, loss
aversion and probability weighting. Moreover, risk attitudes in our sample
depend not only on economic conditions, but also on cultural factors, as
measured by the Hofstede dimensions Individuality and Uncertainty Avoid-
ance.
2 Methodology
The question of how to measure risk preferences has been addressed using
quite different research methodologies. Most prominently are laboratory
experiments that infer risk preferences from individuals’ choices between
simple lotteries. These experiments have shown that there are persistent
discrepancies between predictions of rational models (expected utility the-
ory) and empirical data (see Starmer (2000) for a survey on this issue).
2.1 Participants
In this article, we present results from an international survey of economics
students from 45 countries, the International Test on Risk Attitudes (IN-
TRA), that was conducted by the University of Zurich, Switzerland, in col-
laboration with various universities worldwide.
The survey was conducted with undergraduate students at 53 universi-
ties. A total of 5,912 university students participated in our survey. Most
participants were first or second-year students from departments of eco-
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nomics, finance and business administration. The average age of partici-
pants was 21.5 years (SD=3.82), 52% were males.
2.2 Questionnaire and procedure
Each participant was asked to fill in a questionnaire that included 14 decision
making questions (three time preference questions, one ambiguity aversion
question, and 10 lottery questions that were used to estimate prospect theory
parameters), 19 questions from the Hofstede VSM94 questionnaire (Hofstede
& McCrae 2004), a happiness question and some information about their
personal background, nationality and cultural origin. The questionnaire (see
appendix for a sample questionnaire) was translated into local languages for
each country by professional translators or translators with economic back-
ground. The amount of monetary payoffs in the questions were adjusted
according to each country’s Purchasing Power Parity and the monthly in-
come/expenses of the local students and the local currency was used. The
participants were instructed that there are no wrong or correct answers to
these questions, and that the researchers are only interested in their per-
sonal preferences and attitudes. In most cases, the survey was conducted
during the first 15 to 20 minutes of a regular lecture under the monitoring
of the local lecturers and experimenters. The response rate was therefore
very high (more than 90%).
There could be two major concerns about our survey methodology:
First, we only used university students as subjects, not a representative
sample of the total population. There are, however, several advantages of
this sample selection:
1. First and second year economic students understand better the nu-
meric formulations of lottery and time preference questions than the
general public, but can still answer the questions intuitively.
2. Students from economics can also be expected to play an important
role in economics and financial markets in each country and in the
global market. The time and risk preferences we study here are rele-
vant for those finance-related activities.
3. As Hofstede (1991), a leading researcher in cross-cultural comparisons,
emphasized: to make a cross-national comparison, it is important to
recruit homogeneous, comparable groups from each country in order
to control the background variables as much as possible.
Second, it might be that, since we only asked hypothetical questions
without offering real monetary incentives, participants may not be motivated
to give thoughtful answers. However, researchers who compared directly the
real and hypothetical rewards did not find systematic differences, e.g., John-
son & Bickel (2002). This was confirmed in a pilot study at the University
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of Zurich that we conducted in class (without incentives) and in the lab-
oratory (with monetary incentives following the BDM procedure (Becker,
Degroot & Marschak 1964)). No significant differences were found between
the monetary-incentive group versus the hypothetical-question group.
In any case, these concerns are in our opinion far outweighed by the
possibility to obtain a large sample without the usual self-selection bias that
surveys frequently show.
We measured risk preferences by eliciting the participants’ willingness to
pay for hypothetical lotteries with survey questions like the following:1
Imagine you are offered the lotteries below. Please indicate the maximum
amount you are willing to pay for the lottery:
40% chance win $0
60% chance win $100
I am willing to pay at most $ to play the lottery.
Six of the lotteries were solely about gains with different probabilities (where
one of the lotteries had a very high gain), two were solely about losses.
The remaining two lotteries were mixed lotteries. Here the elicitation was
different:
In the following lotteries you have a 50% chance to win or lose money. The
potential loss is given. Please state the minimum amount $X for which you would
be willing to accept the lottery.
50% chance loss of $100
50% chance win of $X
X should be at least $ to make the lottery acceptable.
Table 1 summarizes the ten lotteries in the questionnaire.
Finally, we need to mention one peculiar issue: the survey was conducted
mainly in the years 2008/2009. This might raise concerns about a potential
impact of the global financial crisis on risk preferences. We cannot exclude
such an impact entirely, but fortunately, if there was an impact, it must
have been smaller than the between-country variations that we measured,
since we did not find any statistically significant difference between the data
collected before and after the onset of the financial crisis. This might be
due to the fact that we did not frame our questions as investment, but as
(more neutral) lottery questions.
3 Preference models and descriptive results
3.1 Prospect theory in parametric form
The probably most widely used models for decision under risk are expected
utility theory (as a normative model) and the various variants of prospect
1See the appendix for a complete sample questionnaire.
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Table 1: Design for the ten lotteries in INTRA.
Lottery Outcome A($) Prob(A) Outcome B($) Prob(B) Average Value ($)
1 10 0.1 100 0.9 91
2 0 0.4 100 0.6 60
3 0 0.1 100 0.9 90
4 0 0.4 10,000 0.6 6000
5 0 0.9 100 0.1 10
6 0 0.4 400 0.6 240
7 -80 0.6 0 0.4 -48
8 -100 0.6 0 0.4 -60
9 -25 0.5 - 0.5 -
10 -100 0.5 - 0.5 -
theory (as a descriptive model). In this article we present results for cumula-
tive prospect theory with the classical specification of (Tversky & Kahneman
1992) and expected utility theory with constant relative risk aversion. The
two models are given as follows:
CPT = (1− w(p))v(A) + w(p)v(B),
EUT = (1− p)u(A+W ) + pu(B +W ),
where A and B are the payoffs of the lottery (A < B), p is the probability to
obtain the higher outcome B, w is the probability weighting function, v the
value function, u the utility function (which we choose to be CRRA to be
close to the CPT model) and W the initial wealth (which is also unobserved
and has therefore to be estimated). w and v are given by:2
v(x) :=
{
xα, x ≥ 0
−λ(−x)β, x < 0, (1)
where λ > 0 is called the “loss-aversion” coefficient, and α, β > 0 (usually
α, β ≤ 1) describe the risk-attitudes for gains and losses.
The standard weighting function is
w(p) :=
pγ
(pγ + (1− p)γ)1/γ (2)
with the parameter γ ∈ (0, 1] describing the amount of over– and under-
weighting. Originally, the weighting function had been allowed to have dif-
ferent parameters in gains and losses (Tversky & Kahneman 1992). Given,
however, that many previous studies find very similar weighting functions
in gains and losses, e.g. Tversky & Kahneman (1992), Camerer & Teck-Hua
2We tried different specifications of w and v and also alternative prospect theory mod-
els, but we do not focus on this in the current article, see Rieger & Bui (2011) for details.
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(1994) and Tversky & Wakker (1995), and to keep the model as parsimonious
as possible, we modeled w in the same way and with the same parameter γ
for gains and losses.
Prospect theory is characterized by four important deviations from ex-
pected utility theory: First, payoffs are evaluated with respect to a fixed
reference point (“gains” and “losses”) and not in terms of final wealth. Sec-
ond, risk preferences differ in gains and losses which is expressed by the
convex-concave shape of the value function v. Third, losses loom larger
than gains, which is expressed by the loss-aversion λ (typically larger than
one) that leads to a steeper value function in losses than in gains. Fourth,
small probabilities have overly large decision weight, as expressed by the
nonlinear probability weighting function w.
A direct comparison of the two models in our sample revealed that ex-
pected utility theory is a reasonable descriptive model only for a minority of
subjects – which is in accordance to many other previous studies: 80.4% of
all subjects showed risk-seeking behavior in losses and risk-averse behavior
in gains, as prospect theory would predict, and 74.5% show loss-aversion.
Estimating prospect theory parameters for single persons is a difficult
task that needs a large amount of lotteries to get at least somehow reliable
results. More frequently, parameters are estimated for median answers of a
group of subjects. We did such estimates for the subjects of each participat-
ing country. For the computation we used a grid search method. With this
we estimated the parameters for the weighting function and value functions
by minimizing the sum of normalized errors for the first eight lotteries, where
the parameter values of α, β, γ varied from 0 to 1. The error function was
defined as the sum of the absolute differences between the CE and the max-
imum outcomes of the lotteries. The normalized errors are the proportion
of those differences and the lottery’s maximum outcome for each lottery.3
Since the loss-aversion parameter λ depends very sensitively on the ratio
between α and β, it is better to report the more robust parameter θ which
has been defined by Tversky & Kahneman (1992) as the ratio between a
gain A and a loss B such that a fifty-fifty lottery between A and B is as
attractive as an outcome of zero. We can compute this parameter easily
from our lotteries 9 and 10, if we divide X by the potential loss (25 or 100,
respectively). The reported value θ is the average of these two numbers.
The resulting prospect parameter estimates α, β, γ and θ are reported
in Table 2. We can see at first glance a couple of interesting facts:
• The estimated values are reasonably close to previous estimates (com-
pare, e.g., Rieger & Wang (2008) for an overview).
3The parameter λ does only influence preferences in mixed lotteries, thus we do not
have to assume anything about λ while estimating the other three parameters from the
lotteries 1–8.
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Table 2: Estimated cumulative prospect theory parameters for the median
answers of each country.
Prospect theory
(based on median CEs)
α β γ θ
Angola 0.60 1.00 0.60 1.45
Argentina 0.60 1.00 0.70 1.09
Australia 0.60 0.95 0.60 1.24
Austria 0.40 0.95 0.65 1.62
Azerbaijan 0.60 1.00 0.65 1.23
Bosnia/Herzegovina 0.65 0.90 0.45 1.00
Canada 0.50 1.00 0.50 2.00
Chile 0.55 1.00 0.65 2.00
China 0.60 1.00 0.60 1.83
Colombia 0.40 1.00 0.35 2.00
Croatia 0.60 1.00 0.45 2.33
Czech Republic 0.60 1.00 0.55 2.00
Denmark 0.50 1.00 0.65 2.00
Estonia 0.50 1.00 0.35 4.00
Georgia 0.55 1.00 0.60 5.50
Germany 0.45 1.00 0.50 2.00
Greece 0.65 0.80 0.50 2.00
Hong Kong 0.40 1.00 0.30 2.43
Hungary 0.50 1.00 0.45 2.00
Ireland 0.50 1.00 0.45 2.00
Israel 0.58 0.95 0.35 1.99
Italy 0.45 1.00 0.50 2.46
Japan 0.45 1.00 0.60 2.00
Lebanon 0.53 0.95 0.25 1.74
Lithuania 0.55 1.00 0.35 2.00
Malaysia 0.58 1.00 0.60 1.50
Mexico 0.40 1.00 0.35 1.50
Moldova 0.65 0.95 0.65 3.44
New Zealand 0.65 0.95 0.50 1.50
Nigeria 0.75 1.00 0.50 2.00
Norway 0.55 1.00 0.55 1.83
Portugal 0.50 1.00 0.65 1.83
Romania 0.50 1.00 0.60 3.33
Russia 0.53 1.00 0.33 3.00
Slovenia 0.55 1.00 0.40 2.12
South Korea 0.60 0.95 0.70 1.37
Spain 0.45 1.00 0.60 2.38
Sweden 0.50 1.00 0.65 2.00
Switzerland 0.45 1.00 0.50 2.00
Taiwan 0.55 0.95 0.53 2.00
Thailand 0.65 0.90 0.55 3.00
Turkey 0.60 1.00 0.65 1.80
UK 0.50 1.00 0.50 1.38
USA 0.58 1.00 0.43 1.65
Vietnam 0.60 1.00 0.55 1.75
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• α is significantly smaller than β, i.e. the median subject is quite risk
neutral in losses, and risk averse in gains.
• The median response in almost all countries indicates loss aversion.
• The heterogeneity between countries is high. Below, we investigate
this point in more details.
3.2 Prospect theory and relative risk premia
The parametric approach has provided us with a bird’s eye view on the
distribution of prospect theory preferences across the world. For a more
detailed analysis, however, we need to use the data on a subject level. This
needs a new approach, since the prospect theory parameter estimation is
not stable enough to give reliable results for each subject: the estimation
procedure is highly nonlinear and extremely sensitive to noise. One excep-
tion is the loss-aversion parameter θ which is robust and can also be used
on an individual level.
To solve the robustness problems, we propose therefore a different set of
parameters that captures the essential features of prospect theory. The key
idea is to compute relative risk premia for the lotteries 1–8 and derive from
them three factors, corresponding to risk aversion in gains, risk seeking
in losses and probability weighting. To do so, we will use two different
methodologies, giving us a solid confirmation for later analyses:
First, we compute the relative risk premium (RRP) for each lottery
question via the standard formula
RRP =
EV − CE
EV
,
where EV is the expected value of the lottery and CE denotes the certainty
equivalent, i.e. the value that has been chosen by the subject.
The RRP is positive whenever a person is risk-averse and negative when
it is risk-seeking. As we have already pointed out, for the majority of sub-
jects the RRP is positive in gain lotteries (lottery 1–6) and negative in loss
lotteries (lottery 7+8). Based on the RRP for these lotteries we can now
define three parameters that measure the essential ideas of prospect theory:
1. The RRP in gains is defined by taking the average RRP over the
lotteries 1–6. This corresponds to the risk-aversion parameter α in
prospect theory (but with opposite direction: larger RRP means more,
not less, risk-aversion).
2. The RRP in losses is defined by taking the average RRP over the
lotteries 7+8. This corresponds to the risk-seeking parameter β in
prospect theory.
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3. The RRP probability weighting is defined as the difference between the
RRP of the lottery 3 (with a 90% chance to win) and the lottery 5 (with
a 10% chance to win). Probability weighting will make lottery 3 less
attractive (high RRP) and lottery 5 more attractive (low RRP), thus
the difference of their RRP should increase. This parameter therefore
corresponds to γ in prospect theory (again with opposite direction).
Contrary to γ in prospect theory, this parameter should be decoupled
from risk aversion which can be seen as an additional advantage.
To test the reliability of this approach, Crombach’s alpha has been computed
for the first two scales, leading to values of 0.753 and 0.942, respectively.
Taking out lottery 5 would increase the reliability of the first scale, but only
marginally, so we decided to keep the original formulation.
As a second robustness test we checked the correlation of our RRP in
gains with the two measures for “propensity to take risk” (in income and
portfolio decisions, respectively) in the data of Statman (2008). The overall
correlation coefficients were −0.546 and −0.565, both significant on the 95%
level (with N = 15 countries in the intersection of both studies), demonstrat-
ing the reproducibility of the results and their robustness against changes
of the survey methodology.
That the RRP approach is more stable than an estimation of the classical
CPT parameters can be seen from the following considerations:
Consider the simple lottery that gives 0 with probability p and y > 0
with probability 1− p. Assume furthermore that subjects do i.i.d. mistakes
e when stating their CE, then RRP = (EV − (CE + e))/EV. Thus, in
the limit, the estimated RRP converge to the true average, since the error
term is linear. Estimating the CPT-parameters, however, leads to a highly
nonlinear contribution of the error e, e.g., we obtain (for simplicity neglecting
probability weighting)
α =
log(1− p)
log(y)− log(CE + e) ,
which is highly nonlinear and also very sensitive to errors, particularly when
CE + e comes close to 0 or y. Due to this nonlinearity, the estimated
parameters will not converge to the true average in the limit.
In principle, we could convert the RRP values back to CPT parameters,
however, as there is a strong interaction between probability weighting and
risk preferences, this would give misleading results. As we will be mostly in-
terested in cross-country differences, the precise scaling of our measurement
is anyway of lesser importance than its reliability.
The estimated country averages for the three parameters can be found
in Table 5. The result is not directly comparable to the prospect theory
parameters from Table 2: instead of taking the median answers for each
country and computing the parameters accordingly, the parameters have
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Table 3: Component matrix for the factor analysis of the relative risk premia.
Components
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
(“gains”) (“losses”) (“prob. weight.”)
RRP lottery 1 0.827 0.199 -0.184
RRP lottery 2 0.865 0.247 0.033
RRP lottery 3 0.872 0.205 -0.132
RRP lottery 4 0.753 0.213 -0.149
RRP lottery 5 0.389 0.127 0.907
RRP lottery 6 0.84 0.186 -0.025
RRP lottery 7 -0.608 0.758 -0.029
RRP lottery 8 -0.615 0.753 -0.002
now been computed for each individual subject before taking the median
for each country. Moreover, the scales are different: a high risk premium
means more risk averse behavior, whereas for α the opposite is the case.
It should be mentioned that a number of countries that show (in the
median) negative probability weighting. In fact, in these countries RRP was
lower for lotteries with a small chance of losing then for lotteries with a small
chance of winning. Given, that the expected value and also the CE were
in these lotteries different, this effect could be attributed to different risk
aversions and does not necessarily imply “negative” probability weighting.
Comparing the values with the CPT values, there are in particular some
differences with respect to the risk attitudes in losses and probability weight-
ing: in prospect theory risk attitudes are also influenced by the parameter
γ, as the probability weighting function is in the standard formulation not
symmetric. A small value of γ can therefore be induced by large risk aver-
sion rather than by genuine overweighting of small probabilities. This can
explain how the small amount of probability weighting that we measured
can still lead to a small value of γ, and how, on the other hand, a substantial
risk seeking behavior in losses (which we observe in more than 80% of the
subjects) can still be modeled with a β that is close to one.
The second approach to stable parameters is based on a factor analysis
of the eight RRP. When prescribing a three-factor model this leads to the
factors presented in Table 3.
We see that the factor loading to some extent mimic the previous theo-
retically motivated definition: whereas the first factor corresponds to risk-
aversion in gains, the second corresponds to the difference of risk attitudes
in losses, and the third one to the difference of risk aversion in particular
in lottery 5, the lottery with the small probability to win, that is similar to
our previously defined probability weighting parameter. The median values
of the three factors for the countries in our study are given in Table 5.
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Choosing two factors, leads to a model representing only the first two
dimensions (without probability weighting), while a fourth factor would re-
flect the difference in risk attitudes towards the high stake lottery 4. For
consistency reasons we decided to use the three-factor model in the following
analysis.
The correlation between the three RRP measurements on the one hand
and the three factors on the other hand is high, as is shown in Table 4.
We will therefore in the following mainly work with the RRP measurements
and use the three factor model as robustness check. The three factors will
be denoted as RRP factor “gains”, RRP factor “losses” and RRP factor
“probability weighting”.
Table 4: Correlation between the three RRP measurements (upper row) and
the three factor model (left column).
RRP for gains RRP for loss RRP for ProbWeight
RRP Factor 1 0.904*** -0.629*** -0.065***
RRP Factor 2 0.242*** 0.777*** -0.052***
RRP Factor 3 0.350*** -0.016 -0.982***
To the three risk parameters that we have now defined (in two different
ways), loss aversion, as measured by θ is added. Since the distribution of
θ is highly skewed (skewness 6.77), even after eliminating outliers, we will
work in the following with log θ.
4 Economics, culture and risk: empirical results
4.1 The role of economic conditions and cultural factors
In this section we study the relation between economic and cultural factors
on the one side and risk preferences on the other side. The empirical findings
about the relation between wealth and risk attitudes are mixed. Some find
poor people are more risk-averse (Fafchamps & Pender 1997, Nielsen 2001);
some find wealthier are more risk-averse (Wik & Holden 1998, Yesuf &
Bluffstone 2008); others find little relationship between risk attitudes and
wealth, e.g., Binswanger (1981) or Mosley & Verschoor (2005). Using the
instrumental variable approach, Tanaka, Camerer & Nguyen (2010) suggest
that risk aversion and impatience may lead to poverty.
Although studies on the influence of wealth and economic conditions on
risk preferences, there has been in recent years also some evidence for the
influence of cultural differences on risk preferences. – We have mentioned
already in the introduction the work by Bontempo et al. (1997), Hsee &
Weber (1999) and Wang & Fischbeck (2008). There is also recent work
by Statman (2008) that suggests a possible influence of individuality (in the
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Table 5: Measurements on relative risk premium parameters across coun-
tries.
Relative risk premium
(median of subjects’ RRP)
RRP gains RRP losses RRP Probability Weighting
Angola 0.64 -0.29 0.06
Argentina 0.74 -0.33 0.00
Australia 0.65 -0.44 0.00
Austria 0.65 -0.38 -0.01
Azerbaijan 0.36 -0.29 0.22
Bosnia/Herzegovina 0.75 -0.61 0.19
Canada 0.77 -0.29 0.00
Chile 0.67 -0.17 0.00
China 0.56 -0.35 0.00
Colombia 0.87 -0.67 0.00
Croatia 0.76 -0.69 0.06
Czech Republic 0.65 -0.49 -0.01
Denmark 0.64 -0.17 -0.11
Estonia 0.91 -0.63 -0.01
Georgia 0.59 -0.17 0.61
Germany 0.80 -0.54 -0.02
Greece 0.66 -0.77 0.15
Hong Kong 0.93 -0.72 -0.02
Hungary 0.83 -0.54 -0.02
Ireland 0.86 -0.54 0.00
Israel 0.83 -0.63 -0.02
Italy 0.80 -0.35 0.06
Japan 0.76 -0.54 -0.01
Lebanon 0.94 -0.88 0.00
Lithuania 0.88 -0.67 0.07
Malaysia 0.64 -0.81 -0.06
Mexico 0.93 -0.72 0.00
Moldova 0.44 -0.32 0.27
New Zealand 0.67 -0.64 0.00
Nigeria 0.69 -0.60 0.15
Norway 0.75 -0.46 -0.02
Portugal 0.61 -0.29 0.00
Romania 0.62 -0.24 0.09
Russia 0.88 -0.73 0.00
Slovenia 0.83 -0.53 -0.06
South Korea 0.55 -0.39 -0.04
Spain 0.72 -0.23 -0.03
Sweden 0.65 -0.21 0.04
Switzerland 0.79 -0.46 -0.03
Taiwan 0.66 -0.54 0.00
Thailand 0.60 -0.52 -0.01
Turkey 0.63 -0.18 0.09
UK 0.72 -0.49 0.00
USA 0.78 -0.43 -0.01
Vietnam 0.67 -0.33 0.00
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sense of Hofstede (1991)) on risk aversion.
A particularly interesting aspect is that differences between nationali-
ties persist even under identical macroeconomic conditions, e.g., it has been
shown in Bartke (2007) that there are significant differences in risk aversion
among different nationalities of foreigners living in Germany that corre-
spond, by the way, quite nicely to the differences that we measure in their
respective home countries.4
However, most of these studies suffered from restrictions in data on risk
preferences and could compare only a few countries that varied in more
than one factor, making it difficult to reach clear conclusions about the
importance of cultural differences in explaining risk preference variation.5
Based on this empirical evidence, a couple of theoretical models explain-
ing differences in risk preferences have been suggested. The most promi-
nent one is probably the already mentioned “cushion hypothesis” (Hsee &
Weber 1999).
Our large-scale survey allows to take a closer empirical look at these
hypotheses and the general question of whether cultural differences influence
risk preferences in a statistically significant way.
4.2 Data selection
The large number of participants on our survey allows to discard subjects
that gave inconsistent answers. We apply to conditions here which we will
call “weak” and “strict consistency” in the following. In both conditions we
exclude strong outliers regarding loss aversion, i.e. subjects with θ < 0.5 or
θ > 100, leaving N=5158 subjects. Moreover, we exclude all subjects that
violated in their answers to the lottery questions weak (respectively strong)
in-betweenness. In other words, a certainty equivalence was only consistent
if it was in-between the maximum and the minimum payoff of the respective
lottery. In the case of weak consistency, it was admissible to choose the
maximum or minimum payoff itself. In the case of strict consistency, this
was excluded as well. Violation of in-betweenness suggests errors or misun-
derstandings of the survey question. Therefore it seems justified to exclude
these subjects from the further analysis. The number of subjects satisfying
weak and strict consistency for all lotteries is N = 3541 and N = 2547,
respectively, and thus still large enough for our empirical analysis. In the
4Since there are only six nationalities in the data, it is not possible to obtain “hard”
statistical evidence, but there is a strong positive correlation and the most risk averse
country among them in our data (Turkey) was also the most risk averse in the data
analyzed in Bartke (2007).
5The largest data sample on risk preferences so far has been collected by Statman (2008)
and included 22 countries. The survey questions on risk, however, were more general, and
the number of countries was still too small to apply rigorous statistical methods. All other
cited studies investigated less than ten countries.
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following we will mostly report results for strict consistent subjects, but
robustness checks for weak consistency showed very similar results.
We measure risk attitudes by three parameters. For three of them we
have the two aforementioned proxies: one based on the theoretical definition
and one based on the three factor model for all eight RRP. The fourth
measure is loss aversion (log θ). When using the RRP measures and loss
aversion we apply WLS regressions to correct for heteroscedasticity where
we use the inverse of the variance in each country as weights. Repeating the
regressions with unweighted OLS did not lead to significant changes in the
results.
A small proportion (around 10%) of our subjects was not studying eco-
nomics or business administration. As robustness checks we have repeated
the regressions without them which did not influence the results significantly.
Similarly, we have checked whether students studying in a foreign country
(also around 10% of our subjects) would affect the results, but we did not
find significant deviation when omitting them.
As independent variables we use age, gender, log(GDP/capita), IDV and
UAI, both as country average and as individual deviation from this average,
and finally dummy variables for cultural regions (e.g. Anglo-American).
GDP/capita is used as a generic proxy for wealth of the subjects (which
we could not measure on an individual level), but also for the overall devel-
opment and stability of the country. It is not possible to disentangle these
factors, as collinearity in our sample would be too high. We have, how-
ever, replaced GDP/capita with HDI (human development index) which
did not change results significantly. The results were the same when adding
more controls like inflation rate, financial development or measurements for
macroeconomic or political stability, taken from the World Bank and from
Porter & Schwab (2008). We therefore refrain from reporting these robust-
ness checks.
Taking age into the regression is meant as a control, not as a mean
to detect age dependency of risk attitudes, since the age distribution of
our sample is (not surprisingly) very uneven (minimum 16 years, maximum
62 years, but only 0.67% older than 40 years). The gender distribution,
however, was rather even (as mentioned above, 52% male, 48% female), thus
significant coefficients in the regression results will indeed point to gender
differences – at least in the subpopulation of undergraduates.
The assignment to cultural clusters was not based on the country the
survey was taken, but on a survey question that asked specifically whether
subjects felt to belong to some other culture than of their current place of
living and if so, to state to which one. All in all 12% of the subjects chose
this option. In this way we secured that students from a different ethnic
background (exchange students or immigrants) were assigned correctly.
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4.3 Within-country and cross-country variation
When studying cross-country variations it is important to check whether
they are actually large enough to justify further investigation or whether
they might be merely an artifact induced by substantial between-subject
variation.
In our data we have both, and it is therefore essential to quantify both
variations. To measure the average within-country variation, we computed
therefore the standard deviations for the four main parameters in each coun-
try and took then the average. To measure, on the other hand, the cross-
country variation, we computed the standard deviation of the country aver-
ages. Table 6 summarizes the results: cross-country variation is substantial,
even though within-country variation (including noise!) is higher. Further
investigation of cross-country differences is therefore promising.
Table 6: Cross-country variation in our sample is substantial (26%–53% of
within-country variation).
RRP gains RRP losses RRP prob.w. log θ
Within-country variation 0.29 0.34 0.81 0.37
Cross-country variation 0.11 0.09 0.43 0.14
Ratio 38% 26% 53% 38%
4.4 Risk-aversion in gains
We start our empirical analysis with the risk attitude in gains (corresponding
to α in prospect theory). Table 7 summarizes the regression results. (All
regression results are – if not stated differently – OLS regressions and are
reported with standardized coefficients and t-values in parentheses.) We see
a significant and robust gender effect: female subjects tend to be more risk
averse in gains which confirms previous studies (Agnew, Anderson, Gerlach
& Szykman 2008, Borghans, Golsteyn, Heckman & Meijers 2009, Byrnes,
Miller & Shafer 1999, Croson & Gneezy 2009, Hartog, Ferrer-i-Carbonell &
Jonker 2002, Schubert, Gysler, Brown & Wolfgang Brachinger 1999).
There is also a significant effect of wealth: subjects from richer countries
tended to be more risk averse. This supports previous studies by Wik &
Holden (1998) and Yesuf & Bluffstone (2008), but contradicts results by
Fafchamps & Pender (1997), Nielsen (2001), Binswanger (1981) and Mosley
& Verschoor (2005).
We also find a strong and robust influence of culture as measured by
Hofstede’s Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI). As expected, a higher UAI
lead to larger risk aversion.
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Table 7: Regression results for the two proxies for risk preferences in gain
lotteries.
RRP for gain lotteries RRP Factor “gains”
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Age -0.089*** -0.066*** -0.076*** -0.055***
(-4.525) (-3.331) (-3.832) (-2.769)
Gender -0.187*** -0.163*** -0.2*** -0.186***
(-9.456) (-8.21) (-10.044) (-9.362)
log GDP/capita 0.113*** 0.128*** 0.074*** 0.095***
(5.71) (6.281) (3.73) (4.629)
IDV, country average -0.002 -0.021
(-0.107) (-0.974)
IDV, ind. difference -0.017 -0.01
(-0.849) (-0.527)
UAI, country average 0.151*** 0.132***
(7.199) (6.209)
UAI, ind. difference 0.05*** 0.048**
(2.569) (2.412)
R2 (%) 5.4 7.9 5 7.1
* =significant on 10% level, **=significant on 5% level, ***=significant on 1% level
Although the data by Statman (2008) suggested a negative relationship,
we did not find any significant impact of Individualism (IDV) on risk aversion
in gains in our larger data sample.
4.5 Risk-seeking in losses
The regression results for risk preferences in losses (Table 8) deviated be-
tween the two dependent variables that we used as proxy. The only robust
difference was that a larger country average for IDV led to a higher RRP in
losses, i.e. reduced the extent of risk-seeking behavior.
This is compatible with the “cushion hypothesis” (Hsee & Weber 1999):
in a less individualistic and more collectivistic surrounding it is possible
for people to take more risk, as a potential loss will be mitigated by the
social network (family, friends, community) surrounding the unlucky person
and forming a kind of safety “cushion”. It is interesting to see that the
effect of the individual difference to the average IDV in a country was not a
significant contributor to explaining risk attitudes in losses. The influence
can therefore be seen as an effect of the surrounding rather than an effect
of any personality trait of the person taking the risk. This again is nicely in
line with the cushion hypothesis.
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Table 8: Regression results for the two proxies for risk preferences in loss
lotteries.
RRP for loss lotteries RRP Factor “loss”
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Age -0.006 -0.028 -0.065*** -0.076***
(-0.308) (-1.396) (-3.227) (-3.677)
Gender 0.123*** 0.109*** -0.024 -0.023
(6.077) (5.353) (-1.183) (-1.106)
log GDP/capita -0.009 -0.032 0.056*** 0.039*
(-0.456) (-1.557) (2.756) (1.867)
IDV, country average 0.057** 0.062***
(2.474) (2.717)
IDV, ind. difference 0.003 -0.018
(0.135) (-0.87)
UAI, country average -0.107*** -0.004
(-4.851) (-0.172)
UAI, ind. difference -0.041** -0.012
(-2.049) (-0.584)
R2 (%) 1.5 3.5 0.8 1.2
* =significant on 10% level, **=significant on 5% level, ***=significant on 1% level
Table 9: Regression results for the two proxies for probability weighting.
RRP for Prob Weight RRP Factor “Prob Weight”
Model 1 Model 2 Model3 Model 1 Model 2 Model3
Age -0.039* -0.035* -0.036* -0.009 -0.02 -0.016
(-1.906) (-1.646) (-1.721) (-0.427) (-0.977) (-0.781)
Gender -0.065*** -0.074*** -0.07*** 0.062*** 0.059*** 0.056***
(-3.156) (-3.533) (-3.355) (3.07) (2.915) (2.742)
log GDP/capita -0.116*** -0.099*** -0.1*** 0.159*** 0.146*** 0.149***
(-5.704) (-4.207) (-4.209) (7.897) (6.966) (7.1)
IDV, country av. -0.06** -0.061** 0.024 0.021
(-2.505) (-2.535) (1.052) (0.946)
IDV, ind. diff. -0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.002
(-0.155) (-0.055) (0.063) (0.088)
UAI, country av. -0.038* -0.032 -0.063*** -0.077***
(-1.645) (-1.325) (-2.918) (-3.429)
UAI, ind. diff. -0.022 -0.024 0.009 0.011
(-1.067) (-1.194) (0.443) (0.53)
Trust 0.004 -0.029
(0.166) (-1.405)
Empathy/Faith 0.045** -0.057***
(2.183) (-2.807)
R2 (%) 2.2 2.5 2.7 3.1 3.7 4.1
* =significant on 10% level, **=significant on 5% level, ***=significant on 1% level
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4.6 Probability weighting
In the case of probability weighting (and the following case of loss aversion),
we augmented the regression model with two more variables: trust and
self-responsibility. Trust has been measured as the level of agreement to
the statement: “Most people can be trusted.” Empathy/Faith has been
measured as the level of disagreement to the statement: “When people have
failed in life it is often their own fault.”
When studying the regression results (Table 9), it is important to keep
in mind that the the RRP in this case has the opposite direction of the
RRP Factor (Pearson correlation is -0.982). Therefore we see that there are
a number of robust relations:
We see a strong gender effect: female subjects show stronger proba-
bility weighting than males, similar to Fehr-Duda, De Gennaro & Schubert
(2006). There is also a strong wealth effect: in wealthier countries, probabil-
ity weighting is smaller. The cultural effects are less robust. The strongest
effect can be found for empathy/faith: larger values correspond to larger
probability weighting. A possible explanation would be that an overweight-
ing of small probabilities does it seem likelier that a failure is caused by an
unlikely strike of bad luck, rather than by a person’s own faults.
4.7 Loss-aversion
For loss aversion as measured by log θ we find a number of consistent effects
(Table 10): first, there is a significant gender difference, in that female
subjects showed a stronger loss aversion. There was also a strong influence
of IDV: a larger country average of individuality corresponds to a smaller loss
aversion, while individual differences point to the opposite direction. This
is certainly a puzzling observation that is difficult to explain, in particular
given the aforementioned cushion hypothesis.
The effect of UAI is again easy to interpret: larger levels of UAI corre-
spond to larger loss aversion – on the country level, but also with respect to
individual differences.
Finally, trust is reducing loss aversion. This can be interpreted in the
way that less loss averse subjects are less afraid from potential abuse of their
trust by other people.
4.8 Cultural clusters
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are a very successful tool for detecting cul-
tural differences, but of course they cannot detect every cultural difference.
It is therefore interesting to test whether there are (after controlling eco-
nomic conditions, but also IDV and UAI) still significant differences in risk
preferences between cultural clusters. We decompose our sample for this
purpose into eight cultural clusters as in Wang, Rieger & Hens (2009):
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Table 10: Regression results for the loss aversion log θ.
Loss aversion (log θ)
Model 1 Model 2 Model3
Age 0.019 0.031** 0.034**
(1.357) (2.151) (2.338)
Gender -0.100*** -0.097*** -0.096***
(-6.941) (-6.722) (-6.667)
log GDP/capita -0.032** -0.021 -0.019
(-2.228) (-1.419) (-1.296)
IDV, country average -0.045*** -0.049***
(-3.024) (-3.266)
IDV, ind. difference 0.028* 0.029**
(1.93) (1.999)
UAI, country average 0.044*** 0.035**
(2.947) (2.249)
UAI, ind. difference 0.034** 0.034**
(2.353) (2.355)
Trust -0.03**
(-2.03)
Empathy/Faith -0.016
(-1.113)
R2 (%) 1.1 1.8 1.9
* =significant on 10% level, **=significant on 5% level, ***=significant on 1% level
Table 11: Percentage of subjects in each cultural cluster
Africa Anglo/American East Asia East Europe
2.0% 8.8% 18.5% 22.9%
Germanic/Nordic Latin America Latin Europe Middle East
21.9% 5.8% 4.1% 5.7%
20 4 ECONOMICS, CULTURE AND RISK: EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 12: Regression results for the RRP of gain lotteries with additional
dummy variables for cultural clusters.
RRP for gain lotteries RRP Factor “gains”
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Age -0.082*** -0.063*** -0.069*** -0.051**
(-3.945) (-3.02) (-3.354) (-2.447)
Gender -0.188*** -0.169*** -0.193*** -0.185***
(-9.419) (-8.489) (-9.674) (-9.294)
log GDP/capita 0.138*** 0.142*** 0.112*** 0.109***
(5.65) (5.839) (4.543) (4.449)
IDV, country average -0.018 -0.048*
(-0.678) (-1.879)
IDV, ind. difference -0.015 -0.01
(-0.767) (-0.527)
UAI, country average 0.147*** 0.107***
(6.567) (4.519)
UAI, ind. difference 0.054*** 0.05**
(2.773) (2.539)
cultural dummies:
Africa 0.006 0.002 0.002 -0.015
(0.302) (0.112) (0.097) (-0.707)
Anglo-American 0.041 0.068** 0.008 0.032
(1.431) (2.358) (0.272) (1.074)
Germanic/ Nordic 0.086** 0.106*** 0.012 0.047
(2.193) (2.628) (0.319) (1.175)
East Asia 0.029 0.053 -0.002 0.006
(0.847) (1.572) (-0.059) (0.164)
Latin America 0.119*** 0.118*** 0.079*** 0.068***
(4.644) (4.569) (3.194) (2.711)
Latin Europe 0.036 0.009 0.022 -0.009
(1.317) (0.341) (0.874) (-0.355)
East Europe 0.123*** 0.106*** 0.122*** 0.103***
(3.555) (2.996) (3.509) (2.868)
Middle East 0.061*** 0.061** 0.06*** 0.06**
(2.581) (2.537) (2.573) (2.548)
R2 (%) 6.9 9.2 6.7 8.3
* =significant on 10% level, **=significant on 5% level, ***=significant on 1% level
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Table 13: Regression results for the RRP of loss lotteries with additional
dummy variables for cultural clusters.
RRP for loss lotteries RRP Factor “loss”
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Age 0.012 -0.008 -0.045** -0.055***
(0.549) (-0.384) (-2.104) (-2.591)
Gender 0.118*** 0.109*** -0.022 -0.021
(5.763) (5.335) (-1.081) (-1.044)
log GDP/capita -0.062** -0.067*** 0.009 0.003
(-2.471) (-2.689) (0.371) (0.122)
IDV, country average 0.092*** 0.079***
(3.474) (3.012)
IDV, ind. difference 0.001 -0.019
(0.066) (-0.935)
UAI, country average -0.095*** -0.006
(-3.877) (-0.23)
UAI, ind. difference -0.042** -0.011
(-2.095) (-0.551)
cultural dummies:
Africa -0.011 0.008 -0.026 -0.017
(-0.538) (0.38) (-1.215) (-0.772)
Anglo-American 0.055* 0.03 0.068** 0.054*
(1.838) (0.995) (2.187) (1.725)
Germanic/ Nordic 0.096** 0.047 0.102** 0.072*
(2.428) (1.154) (2.543) (1.748)
East Asia 0.034 0.021 0.008 0.006
(0.946) (0.58) (0.229) (0.158)
Latin America 0.017 0.036 0.061** 0.077***
(0.718) (1.473) (2.389) (2.969)
Latin Europe 0.044* 0.086*** 0.076*** 0.089***
(1.673) (3.184) (2.976) (3.409)
East Europe -0.021 -0.015 0.045 0.03
(-0.613) (-0.415) (1.248) (0.803)
Middle East -0.036 -0.043* 0.018 0.007
(-1.507) (-1.782) (0.729) (0.272)
R2 (%) 2.5 4.4 1.8 2.3
* =significant on 10% level, **=significant on 5% level, ***=significant on 1% level
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Table 14: Regression results for the probability weighting RRP with addi-
tional dummy variables for cultural clusters.
RRP for Prob Weight RRP Factor “Prob Weight”
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Age -0.032 -0.031 -0.005 -0.012
(-1.546) (-1.43) (-0.23) (-0.555)
Gender -0.067*** -0.078*** 0.058*** 0.059***
(-3.268) (-3.731) (2.933) (2.94)
log GDP/capita -0.14*** -0.14*** 0.139*** 0.137***
(-5.388) (-5.213) (5.659) (5.544)
IDV, country average -0.11*** 0.035
(-3.854) (1.37)
IDV, ind. difference -0.002 0.000
(-0.122) (-0.017)
UAI, country average -0.077*** -0.024
(-3.059) (-0.991)
UAI, ind. difference -0.02 0.006
(-0.992) (0.295)
cultural dummies:
Africa 0.001 0.004 -0.076*** -0.069***
(0.054) (0.192) (-3.597) (-3.217)
Anglo-American -0.051 -0.046 0.106*** 0.098***
(-1.514) (-1.363) (3.537) (3.225)
Germanic/ Nordic -0.124*** -0.087* 0.209*** 0.193***
(-2.7) (-1.854) (5.368) (4.842)
East Asia -0.151*** -0.157*** 0.263*** 0.261***
(-3.762) (-3.888) (7.437) (7.379)
Latin America -0.089*** -0.132*** 0.118*** 0.125***
(-3.281) (-4.572) (4.77) (4.981)
Latin Europe 0.023 0.018 0.046* 0.057**
(0.935) (0.732) (1.878) (2.254)
East Europe -0.067* -0.049 0.133*** 0.133***
(-1.92) (-1.38) (3.842) (3.696)
Middle East 0.016 0.023 0.051** 0.048**
(0.72) (1.055) (2.188) (2.026)
R2 (%) 3.6 4.4 7.3 7.5
* =significant on 10% level, **=significant on 5% level, ***=significant on 1% level
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Table 15: Regression results for log θ with additional dummy variables for
cultural clusters.
Loss aversion (log θ)
Model 1 Model 2
Age -0.012 -0.005
(-0.552) (-0.224)
Gender -0.12*** -0.113***
(-5.944) (-5.596)
log GDP/capita -0.043* -0.06**
(-1.689) (-2.33)
IDV, country average 0.011
(0.399)
IDV, ind. difference 0.009
(0.44)
UAI, country average 0.093***
(3.746)
UAI, ind. difference 0.043**
(2.141)
cultural dummies:
Africa 0.004 -0.001
(0.204) (-0.066)
Anglo-American 0.015 0.028
(0.5) (0.934)
Germanic/ Nordic 0.097** 0.117***
(2.52) (2.968)
East Asia 0.052 0.058*
(1.493) (1.666)
Latin America 0.054** 0.048**
(2.265) (1.983)
Latin Europe 0.049* 0.029
(1.868) (1.062)
East Europe 0.171*** 0.146***
(5.441) (4.447)
Middle East 0.031 0.021
(1.309) (0.862)
R2 (%) 4.1 4.9
* =significant on 10% level, **=significant on 5% level, ***=significant on 1% level
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African countries, Anglo-American countries, Germanic/Nordic countries,
East Asian countries, Latin America, Latin Europe, East Europe and Mid-
dle East. Subjects that stated other cultural regions (or did not specify their
different cultural roots precisely) were categorized as “others” and form the
benchmark of our regressions where we add dummy variables for the eight
cultural clusters. Table 11 shows the distribution of the clusters in our
sample.
The regressions results (Table 12–15) demonstrate that there is a sub-
stantial amount of cultural differences which is not covered by the cultural
dimensions alone. This can be seen also in the increasing explanatory power
(measured by R2) as compared to the previous regressions.
The main effects that we have reported in the previous sections are ro-
bust under adding cultural cluster dummy variables. Additional interesting
observations are the significantly larger risk aversion in gains for Latin and
Eastern Europe and the Middle East, the reduced probability weighting in
Germanic/Nordic, East Asian and Latin American countries, and the in-
creased loss aversion in Germanic/Nordic, Latin America and in particular
Eastern European countries.
4.9 Summary of the regression results
We summarize the (robust) results of the regressions from the last subsec-
tions in Table 16. We mention that in this table we have signed all variables
in the most “natural” way, e.g. a “+” in the third column would mean that
a person is more risk seeking in losses if the variable in the first column
is larger. (Please note that in this case, this sign is opposite to the RRP
in losses.) One could therefore say that all four risk variables in this ta-
ble measure the amount of certain “biases” or, more precisely, the amount
of deviation from risk neutrality.6 A minus sign therefore implies that the
variable in the first column has a mitigating effect on these biases, while a
plus sign aggravates the bias. One interesting observation is that nearly all
variables considered mitigate some biases, but aggravate others (or are only
partially relevant).
4.10 Do cultural differences cause risk preferences to differ?
Our results so far suggest that there is a significant relation between differ-
ences of culture and risk preferences. Besides the obvious interpretation that
culture forms preferences, it would be as conceivable that both are formed
6One could argue with Rabin (2000) that any substantial deviation from risk neutrality
in small stake gambles points to behavioral biases: even if taking into account that some
of our stakes were probably not small for the subjects, the large amount of risk aversion
shown by many participants would allow to apply his argument.
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independently by underlying factors (besides economic conditions) or that
culture is indeed influenced by risk preferences.
To find support for a causal influence of culture on risk preferences, we
apply an instrumental variable approach.7 We use two variables that have
already been used as instrumental variables for cultural dimensions: the
distribution of blood types as a proxy for genetic and hence cultural distance,
and the distribution of the main religions as a proxy for different cultural
development in the past (Huang 2007, Spolaore & Wacziarg 2009, Guiso,
Sapienza & Zingales 2009, Gorodnichenko & Roland 2010, Wang et al. 2009).
Table 16: Rough summary of the regression results for the four risk param-
eters. A bold face “+” denotes a robust positive influence, “(+)” denotes a
mostly positive, but sometimes insignificant influence, “–” and “(–)” denote
accordingly negative influences. The parameters are defined such that the
deviation from risk neutrality increases when the parameter increase. Thus
a minus sign points usually to a reduction of behavioral biases. Everything
is valid only “ceteris paribus”, i.e. controlling for other variables.
Risk aversion Risk seeking Probability Loss aversion
in gains in losses weighting
Gender (male) – (–) – –
log(GDP/capita) + (+) –
IDV, country average – (–) –
IDV, individual diff. +
UAI, country average + (+) (–) +
UAI, individual diff. + (+) +
Trust –
Emapthy/Faith +
Africa
Anglo/American (–)
Germanic/Nordic (–) – +
East Asia –
Latin America + – +
Latin Europe –
East Europe + (–) +
Middle East +
The distribution of blood types has been measured based on the percent-
age of the population in a country having the blood types A, B, AB and O.8
A good instrumental variable is given by the l1-distance between the blood
type vectors, which is the sum of the absolute differences for each of the
7We follow Wang et al. (2009) in several technical details.
8Values for Croatia, Slovenia, Taiwan and Chile were not available and replaced with
the linguistically closest neighbors. Colombia and Mexico were excluded due to lack of
data.
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four types. The difference of two countries with respect to the distribution
of the main religions has been measured as the Euclidean distance between
the vectors reflecting the percentage of protestants, catholics, orthodoxes,
muslims, buddhists, jews and others in the countries, where the category
“others” was normalized such that the sum of all categories added to one.
In both cases, “difference” has to be measured with respect to a base
country. Since in both IDV and UAI Sweden showed the most extreme values
in our sample (highest individuality and lowest uncertainty avoidance), we
chose this country as benchmark. Scatterplots and histograms of the two
main instrumental variables and UAI and IDV (on the country level) can
be found in Fig. 1.
As controls in our two-stage least-square regression we used age, gender
and log(GDP/capita). As robustness checks we applied both instrumental
variables together and separately and applied the Mahalanobis distance as
alternative metric for both, blood types and religions.
As selection criterion for subjects we use the weak consistency. In the
case of log θ as dependent variable, we only use the usual restriction that
θ ∈ [0.5, 100]. UAI and IDV are, as usual, measured on the individual level.
We do not take the country average into account in this case, in order to
have only one predictor in every two-step least square regression.
We investigate causality for all cases where we have found strong and
robust evidence for a relation between cultural dimensions and risk prefer-
ences in the previous sections: For lotteries in gains, we test the impact of
UAI. For lotteries in losses and for loss aversion, we test the impact, both
of UAI and IDV.
We conducted a number of robustness checks where we varied the mea-
surement of the instrumental variables (using alternative distances, like the
Mahalanobis metric and the l∞- or supremum-metric), the number of control
variables, or replaced the average RRP with the corresponding RRP factor
variable. A few of these robustness checks can be found in the following
regression tables, particular in the first of them (Table 17).
The instrumental variable analysis suggests in several instances a causal
relation between cultural variables and risk preferences:
• For gain lotteries, a very robust and significant impact of UAI on risk
aversion has been found (Table 17).
• For loss lotteries, there is a significant impact of UAI and IDV on risk
aversion (Table 18), where UAI increases, while IDV decreases risk-
seeking behavior. Again, the influence of IDV gives some support for
the cushion hypothesis.
• The impact of UAI and IDV on loss aversion is mostly significant, but
not strongly. Moreover, the result is not as robust: when choosing re-
ligion as instrumental variable, significance is usually lost. This might
4.10 Do cultural differences cause risk preferences to differ? 27
point to a problem with this instrumental variable, e.g., to a a direct
effect of religion on loss aversion which was supported in additional
regression analyses: we added the proportion of the six main religions
into the regression and found a very strong effect of the percentage of
orthodox people in a country. The effect was stable when controlling
for UAI, IDV and even for cultural clusters (compare Table 20).9 This
suggests that genetic distance (as proxied by the blood type distance)
is the superior instrumental variable in this case.
Table 17: Results of the two-stage least square regression on RRP in gains.
Dependent var.: RRP gain lotteries Factor “Gains”
Instruments:
Blood dist. yes yes
– Mahalanobis yes yes
Religion dist. yes yes
– Mahalanobis yes yes
Controls:
Age -0.033 -0.031 -0.032 -0.049* -0.033
Gender -0.072*** -0.069*** -0.070*** -0.080** -0.079*
log(GDP/capita) 0.188*** 0.188*** 0.188*** 0.161*** 0.109***
Predictor:
UAI 0.526*** 0.572*** 0.555*** 0.842*** 1.099***
t-value (2.583) (2.764) (2.706) (3.84) (4.141)
Regression:
F-value 33.8*** 32.8*** 33.2*** 25.2*** 21.4***
p-value < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
9In fact, no other risk parameter was influenced in such a robust and highly significant
way by a religion than loss aversion was by orthodox christianity. An interesting point
that suggests further inquiry.
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Table 18: Results of the two-stage least square regression on RRP in losses.
Dependent var.: RRP losses lotteries
Instruments:
Blood yes yes yes yes
Religion yes yes yes yes
Controls:
Age -.080*** -.078*** -.083*** -.084*** -.075*** -.077***
Gender .103*** .103*** .104*** .023 .036 .033
log(GDP/capita) -.063** -.060* -.069** -.008 -.007 -.007
Predictor:
IDV .911*** .859*** .997***
t-value (2.899) (2.580) (3.227)
UAI -.807*** -.641*** -.678***
t-value (-3.565) (-3.007) (-3.140)
Regression:
F-value 7.2*** 7.1*** 7.3*** 8.2*** 8.1*** 8.1***
p-value < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
Table 19: Results of the two-stage least square regression on the log θ.
Dependent var.: Loss aversion (log θ)
Instruments:
Blood yes yes yes yes
Religion yes yes yes yes
Controls:
Age .054*** .053*** .055*** .048*** .044*** .052***
Gender -.087*** -.087*** -.087*** -.063*** -.069*** -.056***
log(GDP/capita) -.032 -.033 -.030 -.054*** -.056*** -.052***
Predictor:
IDV -0.568* -0.545 -0.614**
t-value (-1.657) (-1.276) (-2.441)
UAI 0.348* 0.278 0.428**
t-value (1.91) (1.447) (2.365)
Regression:
F-value 12.8*** 12.8*** 13.2*** 16.7*** 16.9*** 16.5***
p-value < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
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Table 20: Impact of religions (in particular orthodox christianity) on loss aversion.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
std.coeff. t-value std.coeff. t-value std.coeff. t-value std.coeff. t-value
Age -0.01 -0.56 -0.03 -1.29 -0.03 -1.33 -0.01 -0.50
Gender -0.11*** -5.28 -0.11*** -5.30 -0.11*** -5.29 -0.11*** -5.25
log(GDP/capita) -0.02 -0.87 -0.04 -1.45 -0.03 -1.07 -0.02 -0.93
IDV, country average 0.03 1.30 0.02 0.94 0.01 0.22 0.02 0.55
IDV, individual difference 0.01 0.30 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.34
UAI, country average 0.10*** 4.78 0.14*** 5.32 0.12*** 4.14 0.10*** 4.10
UAI, individual difference 0.04** 2.07 0.04** 2.01 0.04** 2.12 0.04** 2.09
Orthodox population 0.14*** 6.54 0.17*** 5.45 0.14*** 4.16 0.13*** 5.29
Catholic population 0.03 0.67 0.01 0.2
Proptestant population 0.09* 1.93 0.05 1.01
Muslim population -0.02 -0.70 -0.03 -0.80
Buddhist population 0.07* 1.68 0.12** 2.51
Jewish population 0.04* 1.95 0.03 1.03
Africa 0.01 0.25 0.00 -0.02
Anglo-American 0.04 1.42 0.02 0.79
Germanic/Nordic 0.13*** 3.24 0.11*** 2.78
East Asia 0.03 0.64 0.07** 2.07
Latin America 0.07** 2.48 0.06 2.29
Latin Europe 0.03 1.11 0.02 0.67
Eastern Europe 0.12*** 3.28 0.09*** 2.59
Middle East 0.05 1.14 0.03 1.05
30 5 CONCLUSION
5 Conclusion
We have presented results from the first large-scale international survey on
risk preferences. Cultural differences do not prevent risk preferences to be
qualitatively different, i.e. most people worldwide follow in their behavior
the typical features that prospect theory captures: risk aversion in gains,
risk seeking behavior in losses, overweighting of small probabilities and loss
aversion. The quantitative differences, however, are large: not only on an
individual level, but also on a between-countries level. These differences can
be explained to some extent by economic, but also cultural differences. Using
a regressions analysis and an instrumental variables approach, we found
support for the hypothesis that cultural factors indeed cause substantial
differences in risk preferences.
Our results might serve as an interesting starting point for further re-
search in cultural economics. Moreover, future research should also relate
our findings to international differences in market returns, as for example
the cost of capital.
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A Instrumental variables
Figure 1 gives an overview of the two main instrumental variables, their
correlations with the two main cultural dimensions and their distributions.
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Figure 1: Scatterplot matrix for the two main instrumental variables (reli-
gious Euclidean distance and blood types l1 distance), IDV and UAI on the
country level.
Figure 1: Scatterplot matrix for the two main instrumental variables (reli-
gious Euclidean distance and blood types l1-distance), IDV and UAI on the
country level.
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